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WISCONSIN'S CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT HABIT:
A DISEASE OR A CURE?
JOSEPH A. RANNEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the potential value of state constitutions as "a mine of
instruction for the natural history of democratic communities" was
recognized more than a century ago,1 serious drilling into the mine
began only recently.2  Jurists have debated the proper ideal for
American constitutions. Should they be concise, unchanging documents
that embody only the most fundamental principles of government, or
should they be faithful mirrors of social change that are only modestly
more difficult to amend than statutes?
3
The ideal of concise, unchanging constitutions has proven
unattainable, but American states differ greatly in the number of
constitutions they have adopted and the rate at which they have
amended such constitutions. Different models appear to have worked
well for different states. Donald Lutz has suggested that a successful
constitutional system might be defined as one which features "a
* B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Yale Law School; Adjunct Professor, Marquette
University Law School; Attorney, DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison, Wisconsin.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES
AND HISTORICAL PATTERNS 3 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN THE STATES] (quoting 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 434
(2d rev. ed. 1981)).
2. See id. See generally STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (G.
Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006).
3. See CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES, supra note 1, at xv; Donald S. Lutz,
Patterns in the Amending of American State Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
THE STATES, supra note 1, at 24-30; STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY, supra note 2, at 1-8; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819)
(referring to a "constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs"). Cf. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 34 (1868) ("How far the constitution of a State shall
descend into the particulars of government is a question of policy addressed to the convention
which forms it.").
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constitution of considerable age" with a "moderate amendment rate-
one that is to be expected in the face of inevitable change," but he has
prudently refrained from anointing any particular model of change as
the most desirable.
Wisconsin meets Lutz's criteria for a successful constitutional
system. Wisconsin has retained its original 1848 constitution, which is
the oldest state constitution outside New England. Wisconsin has
amended its constitution 145 times in 158 years, a frequency that may
sound high at first blush but in fact is lower than that of most states
Nevertheless, recently there have been rumblings of discontent. Critics
have suggested that Wisconsin's constitution contains too many obsolete
provisions and that it has been used too much in recent years as a vessel
for contemporary social agendas.6
The history of Wisconsin's constitution provides useful clues as to
whether the constitution has been successful, how the success of
constitutional systems should be measured, and whether it is time for a
new constitution in Wisconsin. This Article approaches such questions
from several angles. First, it examines the 1848 constitution's genesis
and evolution. The constitution's birth gave rise to a tradition of
constitutional caution. Wisconsin voters rejected the first attempt at a
constitution in 1846 because it contained many controversial reform
provisions; the 1847-1848 constitutional convention took heed and left
such issues to the legislature. 7 Legal historians have identified several
waves of American state constitutional reform, including widespread
limits on state subsidy of internal improvements in the mid-nineteenth
century, regulation of railroads and corporations in the late nineteenth
century, and Progressive-era reform of governmental and tax structures
4. Lutz, supra note 3, at 29.
5. See Wls. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN 2005-2006
BLUE BOOK 235-40 (2005) [hereinafter 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK]; infra text
accompanying notes 149, 161; see also Lutz, supra note 3, at 32-34 (showing that Wisconsin's
amendment rate is lower than that of 28 other states).
6. See, e.g., Marquette Univ. Law School, Wisconsin Constitution Conference - Some
Arguments for a New Wisconsin Constitution, http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-
bin/site.pl?alumni/for (last visited Mar. 1, 2007); Marquette Univ. Law School, Wisconsin
Constitution Conference - Some Arguments Against a New Wisconsin Constitution,
http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?alumni/against (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
7. JOSEPH A. RANNEY, TRUSTING NOTHING TO PROVIDENCE: A HISTORY OF
WISCONSIN'S LEGAL SYSTEM 49-65 (1999); Journal and Debates of the Constitutional
Convention 1847-1848 (December 16, 1847), reprinted in THE ATTAINMENT OF
STATEHOOD, at 179 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1928).
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in the early twentieth century.8 Wisconsin joined in these constitutional
movements but did so more cautiously than many of its sister states.9
The Article then examines Wisconsin's constitutional amendments
since 1848 in the aggregate. Scholars have traditionally classified
constitutional amendments into several basic categories, including bills
of rights; suffrage; organization of the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of government; and local government powers.0  Two
additional categories, taxation and gambling, have played an important
part in Wisconsin constitutional history." The Article discusses
differences of historical timing between these categories. Several
categories have been a regular subject of constitutional amendment
since statehood, but significant numbers of amendments did not occur in
other categories until the late twentieth century.
Another classification, not previously identified by scholars, proves
surprisingly informative: "housekeeping" measures, that is, details of
government which would today be identified as primarily
administrative, contrasted with more substantive measures. Early
examples of housekeeping measures include the setting of gubernatorial
and legislative salaries and the terms of office of sheriffs and other local
officeholders. 2 Wisconsin voters have frequently rejected housekeeping
amendments, which suggests that such matters are better left to the
legislature. 3 However, it is difficult to draw a bright line between
housekeeping and substantive amendments: one must bear in mind that
some measures considered administrative today may have seemed
substantive to Wisconsin's founders, who acted in an era when
government was smaller and more intimate than it is now, and
substantive and administrative aspects of government were not
generally thought of as separate.
Next, the Article examines the rates at which Wisconsin voters have
rejected amendments over the years. 14 Prior to 1900, voters rejected
relatively few amendments. Surprisingly, although Wisconsin was a
leader in the Progressive reform movement between 1900 and 1920, it
8. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES, supra note 1, at 4-16.
9. See generally infra Part II.
10. COOLEY, supra note 3, at 34-35; Lutz, supra note 3, at 36.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 131-135, 179-81.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 39, 86-88.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 39, 86-88.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 182-86. Proposed amendments must be passed by
the legislature at two consecutive sessions and then ratified by the voters in order to take
effect. WIS. CONST. of 1848 art. XII, § 1.
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rejected many Progressive-inspired amendments and the overall
amendment rejection rate rose dramatically during the Progressive era."
Rejection rates fell thereafter and remained relatively low until the
1990s, when reformers again chose to pursue social change through the
constitution. 16
The Article concludes by considering from a historical perspective
the question: Is Wisconsin's constitution sound, and if it is to be
changed, how should it be changed? The 1847-1848 convention was
wise not to enshrine controversial social reforms in the constitution. If it
had done so, the 1848 constitution's life might well have been short. But
three points of weakness stand out in the constitution: the housekeeping
clauses and the internal improvement and uniform taxation clauses.
17
Many of the housekeeping clauses were considered points of substantive
importance in 1848, and the issues of internal improvement subsidies
and taxation were considered so fundamental that the convention's
decision to elevate them to the constitutional level is understandable.
18
Nevertheless, they have accounted for a large proportion of proposed
amendments to the constitution ever since statehood. Any new
convention would do well to consider pruning all housekeeping
measures from the constitution and leaving all internal improvements
and taxation issues to the legislature's discretion, subject to limits now
well enshrined in Wisconsin case law. 9 Reformers should also check
any impulse to place controversial social reforms in the constitution and
should consider making the constitutional amendment process more
rigorous. 2
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF WISCONSIN'S CONSTITUTION
A. The 1846 and 1847-1848 Conventions: A Cautionary Lesson
Wisconsin held its first constitutional convention in 1846, in the
middle of an era of legal and social ferment. Reform movements
abounded in America, spurred partly by the ideals of popular
democracy espoused by Andrew Jackson's supporters and partly by a
felt need to shape American law to accommodate western expansion
15. See infra text accompanying note 183.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 183 and 187-95.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 201-09.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 204-09.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 210-17.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 218-20.
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and an increasingly commercial and industrial society. Jacksonians, who
generally viewed banks as instruments of centralization and autocracy,
contested with Whigs who believed banks were essential if America was
to enter the modern economic age.2' In some states, reformers pressed
for government subsidies of railroads and other private companies in
order to foster internal improvements; in other states, where subsidy
policies had resulted in crushing debt, reformers supported legal limits
on subsidies.22 Other reformers advocated for homestead exemptions
providing increased security from the risks associated with creating new
business ventures and settling new lands; laws giving married women
greater control over the property they brought to their marriages; and
popular election of a greater number of state officials, including judges.23
Each of these movements found a voice in Wisconsin's 1846
convention, which was dominated by liberal Jacksonian
"Barnburners."24 The convention devoted much of its time to the bank
issue: the Barnburners, led by future chief justice Edward Ryan, secured
passage of a provision forbidding all banking business in the new state
25
and requiring a phase-out of paper currency in favor of specie.
Despite pleas of more conservative Jacksonians to "let not the avenue
of escape be sealed" and some hesitation even among Barnburners to
enshrine such policy in the constitution, the provision survived
reconsideration.26 The convention also placed a married women's
property rights clause and a clause mandating homestead exemptions in
the constitution, as well as provisions for popular election of judges and
a grant of suffrage to aliens who had declared their intention to become
21. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 76--80, 134-37, 334-39
(1945); RANNEY, supra note 7, at 42-46.
22. CARTER M. GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND
RAILROADS, 1800-1900, at 208-55 (1960); see Journal and Debates of the Convention (Oct.
12, 1846), reprinted in, THE CONVENTION OF 1846 at 90-91 (Milo M. Quaife, ed., 1919).
23. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 185-86, 214-15
(1973); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359,
1423-25 (1983); Lena London, Homestead Exemption in the Wisconsin Constitution, WIS.
MAG. HIST., Dec. 1948, at 176.
24. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 49-50; Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin
Constitution, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 648,656-59.
25. Journal of the Convention (Oct. 9, 1846), reprinted in THE CONVENTION OF 1846,
supra note 22, at 70-71; Speech of Mr. Noggle, DEMOCRAT (Madison, Wis.), Oct. 31, 1846,
reprinted in THE CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 22, at 107-14.
26. Remarks of Mr. Beall, ARGUS (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 10, 1846, reprinted in THE
CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 22, at 123, 127.
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citizens.2 7 But by the convention's end, many delegates were worried
that they had elevated too many reforms to a constitutional level and
that the controversy surrounding the reform clauses might doom the
constitution to defeat. Their pessimism proved justified: in early 1847,
Wisconsin voters decisively rejected the constitution.28
Delegates to a new convention called in the fall of 1847 quickly
demonstrated that they had learned from their predecessors' mistakes.
Byron Kilbourn, the convention chairperson, commented that but for
the banking, married women's, and homestead provisions, "in his
opinion the old constitution would have been very generally acceptable.
Coupled as they had been together, however, both good and bad, and
incapable of separation, the whole had been lost."29 Barnburners and
conservatives now agreed that socially controversial matters should be
left to the legislature. The convention provided for a referendum on
whether a general banking law should be passed and specified that if the
voters approved such a law, the legislature would fill in the details.0
The revised draft constitution enjoined the legislature to enact
"wholesome" homestead exemption laws but prescribed no details; it
omitted any reference to married women's rights.3  The voters
approved the new constitution by a large margin, and Wisconsin became
a state in May 1848.32
Ironically, the process for amending the constitution itself attracted
little attention and generated little debate in either convention. The
1846 convention committee charged with formulating an amendment
process recommended that approval of two-thirds of each legislative
chamber, together with popular ratification, be required for passage of
an amendment, and that the question of holding a new constitutional
convention be submitted to the people once every ten years.33 The
convention rejected a proposal to require passage by two consecutive
27. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 53-59; Journal and Debates of the Convention, reprinted
in THE CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 22, at 70-71, 103-14, 218-20, 229-35, 246-47, 252-
65,631-32,654-55,660--69.
28. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 60--61; ALFONS J. BEITZINGER, EDWARD G. RYAN: LION
OF THE LAW 22-24 (1960).
29. Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1847-1848, supra note 7, at
179.
30. Id. at 548-49; WIS. CONST. of 1848 art. XI, § 1.
31. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 17; RANNEY, supra note 7, at 64-65; Journal and Debates of the
Constitutional Convention of 1847-1848, supra note 7, at 179, 284-86 290, 295, 759-64, 797.
32. Introduction, in THE ATIAINMENT OF STATEHOOD, supra note 7, at vii-viii.
33. Journal of the Convention (Oct. 19, 1846), reprinted in THE CONVENTION OF 1846,
supra note 22, at 191-92.
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legislatures and adopted the committee's proposal with no significant
changes 4 The 1847-1848 convention eliminated the two-thirds vote
requirement but reinstated the requirement for passage by two
consecutive legislatures; it left the matter of future conventions to the
legislature's discretion. 35 As the Prairie du Chien Patriot explained, the
1846 and 1847-1848 conventions reflected prevailing sentiment that the
amendment process should be made relatively difficult:
[T]he constitution is a fundamental law and should not
be subject to frequent changes. . . Thus we see that
fundamental changes are placed beyond the reach of any
sudden ebullition of feeling, prompted by whatever
motive; and the deliberate action of both legislature and
people is required to effect a change so important.36
B. Amendments, 1848-1900: The Perils of Housekeeping
The ideal of a largely inviolate constitution remained strong in
Wisconsin throughout most of the nineteenth century. Relatively few
amendments were proposed, and most of those involved housekeeping
amendments rather than substantive policies. For example, during the
1850s-a period that witnessed major controversies over the balance of
power between Wisconsin's branches of government and over the extent
to which the state should subsidize private enterprise, give relief to
debtors, and enforce unpopular federal fugitive slave laws17-only three
amendments were proposed, all of which dealt with legislative terms of
office and all of which were rejected.3 8 The 1848 constitution specified
the salaries of the governor, lieutenant governor and legislators, and all
four amendments submitted to the voters in the 1860s were proposals
for salary increases.39 A major theme of the 1870s was proposals to
34. See id. at 350.
35. Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1847-1848, supra note 7, at
320, 595, 733-34; Wis. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-2.
36. Selections from the Prairie du Chien PATRIOT, Feb. 15, 1848, reprinted in THE
ATTAINMENT OF STATEHOOD, supra note 7, at 114.
37. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 71-107; see State ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567
(1855); Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195 (1860); In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854); Ableman v. Booth,
11 Wis. 498 (1859).
38. Act of April 13, 1854, ch. 89, § 1-3, 1854 Wis. Sess. Laws 131 (rejected by voters Nov.
1854); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
39. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 21, art. V, §§ 5, 9; 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra
note 5, at 235.
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increase the size of the Wisconsin Supreme Court due to the court's
ever-increasing workload. A proposal to expand the number of justices
from three to five was defeated in 1872 but soon resurfaced and was
approved in 1877.40 Other amendments submitted in the 1880s
concerned official salary increases and whether legislative sessions
should be annual or biennial.'
TABLE 1
AMENDMENTS TO THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION
42
Era Total Average Percentage Percentage of
Amendments per Year Approved "Housekeeping"
Submitted to Amendments
Voters Proposed
1848-1900 24 0.46 71% 75%
1900-1920 27 1.35 52% 33%
1920-1960 40 1.00 73% 33%
1960present 101 2.19 84% 38%
The only nineteenth century amendments of enduring importance
concerned limits on municipal debt and on individual incorporation
laws. 43 Both amendments responded to problems that plagued many
American states in the mid-nineteenth century. Starting in the early
part of the century, most states went through a cycle consisting of a
''wide-open" era in which they actively promoted construction of
railroads and other internal improvements through state subsidies,
followed by a "reactive" era in which such subsidies were restricted or
eliminated and finally by a "municipal" era in which the states debated
the extent to which municipalities should be allowed to subsidize private
enterprise. ' Wisconsin's 1847-1848 convention, heavily influenced by
the recent failure of state subsidy schemes in Michigan and Illinois,
prohibited state aid for internal improvements but said nothing about
40. Act of Mar. 23, 1872, ch. 111, 1872 Wis. Sess. Laws 128 (rejected by voters Nov.
1872); Act of Feb. 24, 1877, ch. 48, 1877 Wis. Sess. Laws 99 (approved by voters Nov. 1877);
2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
41. 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
42. The statistics in the table are compiled from the 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK,
supra note 5, at 235-40.
43. 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
44. GOODRICH, supra note 22, at 208-55; RANNEY, supra note 7, at 123-30.
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municipal subsidies." During the 1850s, many Wisconsin municipalities,
recognizing that procurement of rail service was essential to their
survival, competed to see who could be the most generous in attracting
railroads. Every railroad in Wisconsin became insolvent during the
depression of 1857-1858; as a result, many municipalities faced
potentially ruinous bond and note payment obligations with little to
show for such obligations. 6
Municipalities made repeated efforts to find a legal escape from
their obligations, all of which were rebuffed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. In 1859, the court confirmed that the constitutional prohibition
on subsidies applied only to the state, not to municipalities.47 Justice
Orsamus Cole, who had served in the 1847-1848 convention, explained
frankly that "if the country had then had the experience of the last ten
years ... a provision would have been incorporated in the constitution
to prevent the evil [of unrestrained municipal subsidies]. But this was
not done; and we cannot construe the constitution as though such a
prohibition was there."'  Municipal debtors then argued that railroad
subsidies were invalid because municipalities could only incur debt for
public purposes, not for aid to private corporations. In Whiting v.
Sheboygan & Fond du Lac R.R.,49 the court divided on the issue. Chief
Justice Luther S. Dixon drew a tortuous line between direct aid, which
he concluded was not permissible, and indirect aid such as the purchase
of stock, which was permissible." Justice Byron Paine, dissenting,
argued that railroads "have done more to develop the wealth and
resources ... of the country than any other" force and that it made no
sense to say that subsidies were improper simply because "in executing
the great public work, the state has made use of the agency of a private
corporation, and left to it the comparatively petty and unimportant
profits to be derived from the actual operation of the road!"51  The
Whiting decision was heavily criticized, 2 and in 1874, the legislature and
45. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 66-67; Journal and Debates of the Convention, supra note
22, at 419-20, 581-82.
46. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 126.
47. Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195 (1860); see also Clark v. City of Janesville, 10 Wis. 135
(1859).
48. Bushnell, 10 Wis. at 224.
49. 25 Wis. 167 (1870).
50. Id. at 196-97.
51. Id. at 219-20 (Paine, J., dissenting).
52. See Olcott v. Supervisors of Fond du Lac County, 83 U.S. 678, 695-97 (1873);
RANNEY, supra note 7, at 129-30.
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voters finally resolved the problem by amending the constitution to
provide that municipalities could not incur total debt greater than five
percent of the assessed value of all property within their limits.
53
Prior to the 1870s, legislatures in Wisconsin and most other states
enacted individual charters for corporations; few general incorporation
laws existed." In the 1830s, Jacksonians complained that the individual
incorporation system made it easy for politically-influential businessmen
to obtain "exclusive privileges and monopolies, whereby the few may be
enabled to amass wealth at the expense of the many."" Wisconsin's
1848 constitution permitted, but did not require, the legislature to enact
general incorporation laws.' In the 1850s and 1860s, sentiment for
general incorporation laws increased, partly because of continuing
concerns over favoritism in individual charters but primarily because as
the state and its economy grew, incorporations were consuming ever
greater amounts of the legislature's time.57 In 1872, voters approved an
amendment prohibiting individual laws for corporations and for a
variety of other subjects;" in 1892, the prohibition was extended tomunicipal charters.59
C. Amendments During the Progressive Era, 1900-1920: A Period of
Cautionary Reaction
Wisconsin has long been recognized as one of the most innovative
states of the Progressive era, and the era has justifiably been regarded as
a golden period in Wisconsin's history. From 1901 (when Robert
LaFollette first assumed the governorship) until 1915, Wisconsin
enacted a succession of reforms that put the state at the forefront of the
national transition to a mature industrial society dominated by large
corporate and governmental institutions.6° The variety and extent of
53. Act of Feb. 18, 1874, ch. 37, 1874 Wis. Sess. Laws 43 (approved by voters Nov. 1874);
2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
54. JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND
POLITICS 1791-1875, at 6-14 (1949); RANNEY, supra note 7, at 139-43.
55. GEORGE J. KUEHNL, THE WISCONSIN BUSINESS CORPORATION 72 (1959) (quoting
THE SOUTHPORT AMERICAN (Kenosha, Wis.), August 29, 1846).
56. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
57. See also CADMAN, JR., supra note 54, at 6-14; RANNEY, supra note 7, at 139-43.
58. Act of Mar. 23, 1871, ch. 122, 1871 Wis. Sess. Laws 183 (approved by voters Nov.
1871); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
59. Act of Apr. 22, 1891, ch. 362, 1891 Wis. Sess. Laws 468 (approved by voters Nov.
1892); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
60. See RANNEY, supra note 7, at 255-56, 359-60, 380-88. See generally DAVID P.
THELEN, THE NEW CITIZENSHIP: ORIGINS OF PROGRESSIVISM IN WISCONSIN, 1885-1900
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Progressive reforms was astonishing. In order to improve government
operations, Progressive governors and legislators enacted the nation's
first statewide open primary law in 190361 and a state civil service law in
1905,62 as well as creating a legislative reference library that quickly
became an indispensable clearinghouse of information for reformers
and served as a model for other states.63 Progressives also reshaped
Wisconsin's tax system, which had relied heavily on property taxes in
the nineteenth century, 64 to fit the industrial age: the legislature enacted
an inheritance tax in 190365 and a comprehensive income tax law in 1911
that was carefully designed to distribute the tax burden fairly among old
and new forms of wealth and that soon became the main source of
money to pay for reforms in other areas.6 In 1907, the legislature
enacted one of the first major American public utility laws, which
embodied the doctrine advanced by Richard Ely of the University of
Wisconsin that utilities could function best if they were given local
monopolies and a guarantee of reasonable (albeit limited) profits in
exchange for close government regulation of their rates and
67operations. In 1911, the legislature enacted the nation's first successful
worker's compensation law' and also created the Wisconsin Industrial
Commission, the first American state agency charged with
comprehensive regulation of workplace safety.69 Chief Justice John
Winslow and his colleagues on the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld
(1972); ROBERT S. MAXWELL, LAFOLLETrE AND THE RISE OF THE PROGRESSIVES IN
WISCONSIN (1956); HERBERT F. MARGULIES, THE DECLINE OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT IN WISCONSIN, 1890-1920 (1968).
61. Ch. 451, 1903 Wis. Sess. Laws 754.
62. Ch. 363, 1905 Wis. Sess. Laws 570.
63. Act of Apr. 17, 1901, ch. 168, 1901 Wis. Sess. Laws 213; see also EDWARD A.
FITZPATRICK, MCCARTHY OF WISCONSIN 134-36 (1944).
64. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 290-96; Jack Stark, A History of the Property Tax System
and Property Tax Relief in Wisconsin, in WiS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF
WISCONSIN 1991-1992 BLUE BOOK 103 (1991).
65. Ch. 44, 1903 Wis. Sess. Laws 65.
66. Act of July 13, 1911, ch. 658, 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 984; John 0. Stark, The
Establishment of Wisconsin's Income Tax, WiS. MAG. HIST., Autumn 1987, at 27-45.
67. Act of July 9, 1907, ch. 499, 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 1130; RANNEY, supra note 7, at
317-20; BENJAMIN G. RADER, THE ACADEMIC MIND AND REFORM: THE INFLUENCE OF
RICHARD T. ELY IN AMERICAN LIFE 41-82 (1966).
68. Act of May 3, 1911, ch. 50, 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 43; see also Robert Asher, The 1911
Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Law: A Study in Conservative Labor Reform, WIS.
MAG. HIST., Winter 1973-1974, at 123-140.
69. Act of June 30, 1911, ch. 485, 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 581; RANNEY, supra note 7, at
340-43.
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virtually all of the Progressive reform laws,7° and Winslow gained a
national reputation as a thoughtful exponent of the need to balance
longstanding judicial values of respect for precedent and property rights
against the reality that laws and constitutional interpretation must
change to fit new social conditions.71
The role of constitutional change in the Progressive era has seldom
been examined, perhaps because constitutional amendments played
only a small role in the advance of reform. Strikingly, the rate of
rejection of amendments soared during the era: the legislature
submitted a total of twenty-seven amendments to the voters between
1900 and 1920, but barely half were approved, although several that
passed have had an enduring impact on Wisconsin's legal system. 2
Progressives deeply believed that their reforms were vital to the state's
well-being, but there is no evidence they believed constitutional
enshrinement was vital. A few reforms were implemented through
amendments, mainly in order to eliminate existing constitutional
obstacles. In 1902, voters eliminated the constitution's limitations on
banking laws and prohibited railroads from issuing free passes, but these
changes had been initiated before the Progressives took power." With
LaFollette's approval, the 1905 legislature approved an amendment
eliminating the 1848 provision extending suffrage to aliens who had
declared their intent to become citizens;7 4 it also set in motion an
amendment authorizing a state income tax.75 Both amendments were
approved by the 1907 legislature and ratified by voters in 1908.76
Progressives in other states, most notably California, created
constitutional provisions allowing voters to propose laws by petition and
to bypass the legislature by enacting laws directly through the initiative
70. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 364-77.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Act of Mar. 23, 1901, ch. 73, 1901 Wis. Sess. Laws 94 (banking laws) (approved by
voters Nov. 1902); Act of May 14, 1901, ch. 437, 1901 Wis. Sess. Laws 623 (free passes)
(approved by voters Nov. 1902); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
74. J. Res. 15, 1905 Wis. Sess. Laws 994; 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note
5, at 235.
75. J. Res. 12, 1905 Wis. Sess. Laws 992; 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note
5, at 235.
76. Act of July 16, 1907, ch. 661, 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 1253 (approved by voters Nov.
1908); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
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and referendum process." Wisconsin's 1911 legislature, which arguably
produced the most important reform legislation of the Progressive era,
approved petition and initiative amendments; the 1913 legislature
followed suit but voters rejected the amendments decisively at the 1914
election, which marked the end of the first Progressive era in
Wisconsin.7 ' The 1911 and 1913 legislatures approved eight other
amendments, all of which were also defeated in 1914. 79 Some were
housekeeping measures-for example, additional judgeships and more
changes in officials' pay were proposed 8 0-but others, such as measures
allowing popular recall of elected officials, establishing a state-
sponsored insurance system, and expanding municipalities' home rule
powers, would have materially advanced the Progressive agenda." It is
not clear why voters rejected the 1914 amendments. The contest
between LaFollette supporters and conservatives for state offices
dominated the 1914 election, and there was little public discussion of the
amendments, but voters responded positively to conservatives'
argument that reform had proceeded too fast and had cost too much,
and most likely this feeling also extended to the amendments.8 Voters
rejected additional amendments submitted at the 1920 and 1922
elections, although most of those involved housekeeping matters; no
further amendments were ratified until 1924.83
D. Amendments, 1920-1960: A Sedate Period
After 1920, the pace of proposed amendments moderated (although
it remained higher than it had been before LaFollette's time) and voter
receptivity to amendments increased.84 The proportion of amendments
dealing with housekeeping matters slowly declined, due in part to a 1929
amendment that finally removed all official pay matters from the
77. JAMES J. RAWLS & WALTON BEAN, CALIFORNIA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY
253-54 (6th ed. 1993); ARTHUR S. LINK & RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, PROGRESSIVISM 34,
57-58, 61(1983).
78. See Act of Aug. 7, 1913, ch. 770, § 1, 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 1209 (rejected by voters
Nov. 1914); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
79. See Act of Aug. 7, 1913, ch. 770, 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 1209 (rejected by voters Nov.
1914); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
80. Ch. 770, §§ 6-7, 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 1209.
81. Id. §§ 11-13, 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 1209.
82. See ROBERT S. MAXWELL, EMANUEL L. PHILIPP: WISCONSIN STALWART 85-89
(1959); MARGULIES, supra note 60, at 157-63.
83. See 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
84. Id. at 236-37; see Figure 1 and accompanying text infra Part III.B.
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constitution and left them entirely to the legislature. 5  The most
controversial, and one of the most persistent, amendment issues during
the 1920-1960 period was the amount of time sheriffs should be allowed
to hold office. The 1848 constitution specified that sheriffs could not
serve consecutive terms: they must step down for at least two years after
serving a term.' Such limitation proved unpopular in many parts of the
state, and the controversy came to a head in the 1920s: in 1922 voters
rejected an amendment allowing unlimited terms, but in 1929 they
approved a provision allowing sheriffs to serve for two consecutive
terms.8 Efforts to remove the two-term limitation were defeated in
1946, 1956 and 1961, but voters finally approved unlimited terms for
sheriffs in 1967.'
Many substantive amendments approved between 1920 and 1960
were merely modest extensions of earlier constitutional reforms.
During the Progressive era, the legislature created the state's first
systematic conservation program through a series of laws, collectively
known as the Forestry Law, that created a state forest reserve, provided
for state management and restoration of northern Wisconsin's logged-
over pine forests, allowed only limited timber harvests on state lands,
and required that timber revenues be used to purchase additional forest
reserves. 89 Because of concerns that the Forestry Law might conflict
with the constitution's prohibition of subsidies for internal
improvements, the 1907 legislature initiated and voters approved in 1910
an amendment explicitly allowing such expenditures.' However, in
State ex rel. Owen v. Donald (1915), the supreme court held that the
1910 amendment was void because of technical defects and because
85. J. Res. 6, 1929 Wis. Sess. Laws 1065 (approved by voters Apr. 1929); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
86. WIS. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (amended 1929).
87. Act of July 27, 1921, ch. 437, 1921 Wis. Sess. Laws 654 (rejected by voters Nov.
1922); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
88. J. Res. 47, 1945 Wis. Sess. Laws 1144 (rejected by voters Apr. 1946); J. Res. 53, 1955
Wis. Sess. Laws 817 (rejected by voters Apr. 1956); J. Res. 9, 1961 Wis. Sess. Laws 693
(rejected by voters Apr. 1961); J. Res. 12, 1967 Wis. Sess. Laws 491 (approved by voters Apr.
1967); 2005-06 Wisconsin Blue Book, supra note 5, at 237-38.
89. Ch. 450, 1903 Wis. Sess. Laws 944; ch. 264, 1905 Wis. Sess. Laws 383; Act of July 9,
1907, ch. 491, 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 1125; Act of May 18, 1909, ch. 137, 1909 Wis. Sess. Laws
138; Act of July 11, 1911, ch. 639, 1911 Wis. Sess. Laws 859. See generally VERNON
CARSTENSEN, FARMS OR FORESTS: EVOLUTION OF A STATE LAND POLICY FOR NORTHERN
WISCONSIN, 1850-1932 (1958).
90. J. Res. 31, 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 1293 (first consideration); Act of June 16, 1909, ch.
514, 1909 Wis. Sess. Laws 661 (approved by voters Nov. 1910); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE
BOOK, supra note 5, at 235; see also CARSTENSEN, supra note 89, at 38-43.
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state forestry expenditures violated the internal improvements clause.9'
Justice Roujet Marshall, writing for the majority, rejected Progressives'
argument that the term "internal improvements" in the constitution
should be defined flexibly to exclude forestry and that creation of the
reserve was a public purpose justifying government expenditures.'
Chief Justice Winslow, concurring, objected to Marshall's narrow
concept of public purpose. Conservation, said Winslow, "has not been
recognized as [a public purpose] until recently perhaps, but that is
merely because the conditions which make it such have only recently
arisen and become acute." 93 Marshall's decision in Owen was unpopular
and played a role in his defeat for reelection two years later.94 In 1924,
voters amended the internal improvements clause of the constitution to
allow state-funded conservation programs (this time taking care to avoid
technical flaws in the amendment process),95 and in 1927, they amended
the constitution's uniform taxation clause to exempt forest lands from
taxation. 96
A central theme of the amendments of the 1920-1960 period was
incremental expansion of governmental authority to promote social and
economic welfare. Following the defeat of a broad municipal home rule
amendment in 1914,7 supporters of increased municipal powers moved
slowly but persistently to obtain what they wanted. A proposed
amendment to allow municipalities to exceed the five percent debt limit
in order to purchase municipal utilities failed in 1924 but passed in
1932.98 Twenty years later, as the "baby boom" generation began to
91. 160 Wis. 21, 84,151 N.W. 331, 351 (1915).
92. Id. at 136-38, 151 N.W. at 369. One eminent legal historian has described Marshall's
opinion as a "deep emotional reaction against the style of legal action that the [Forestry Law]
represented. These feelings grew naturally out of the confrontation between men bred in the
buoyant opportunism of nineteenth-century action and an emerging twentieth century
insistence on closer, more professional rationalization of economic and social processes."
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915, at 585 (1964).
93. 160 Wis. at 160,151 N.W. at 369.
94. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 175-76; see Editorial, WIS. STATE J., April 2, 1917.
95. Act of June 25, 1923, ch. 289, 1923 Wis. Sess. Laws 482 (approved by voters Nov.
1924); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
96. J. Res. 13, 1927 Wis. Sess. Laws 972 (approved by voters Apr. 1927); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
97. Act of Aug. 7, 1913, ch. 770, 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 1209 (rejected by voters Nov.
1914); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
98. Act of June 4, 1923, ch. 203, 1923 Wis. Sess. Laws 380 (rejected by voters Nov. 1924);
J. Res. 14, 1931 Wis. Sess. Laws 948 (approved by voters Nov. 1932); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN
BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
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enter Wisconsin schools and creation of new schools and teachers
became urgent, voters raised the five percent debt limit to eight percent
for combined municipal and school purposes. 9 The limit was raised to
ten percent in 1961.'" The trend spread to the state level at the close of
World War II, a time when Wisconsinites had become fully accustomed
to government playing an active economic and social role and were
looking to state government to ease the transition from a wartime to a
peacetime economy.11 Voters had amended the internal improvements
clause in 1908 to allow highway spending"° and in 1924 to allow forestry
spending; 3 in 1945 they expanded the clause to allow spending on
aeronautical programs,'0 in 1949 to allow subsidies for veterans
housing,"°5 and in 1960 for development of state ports.' °6  Such
amendments were thought necessary in order to avoid concerns over the
constitution's internal improvements clause. 7
The 1920-1960 era also witnessed modest but important changes in
Wisconsin's governmental structure. In 1926, Progressives salvaged a
small part of their direct government program from the wreckage of
1914 by persuading voters (by the narrowest of margins) to adopt a
provision allowing direct recall of state officials. 1°a In 1930, voters
addressed the legislative practice of "logrolling," that is, inserting
individual legislators' pet projects into budget bills and presenting the
governor with the choice of either tolerating waste or vetoing the entire
budget, by amending the constitution to allow the governor to impose
99. J. Res. 6, 1951 Wis. Sess. Laws 638 (approved by voters Apr. 1951); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 237.
100. J. Res. 8, 1961 Wis. Sess. Laws 692 (approved by voters Apr. 1961); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 237.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 105-07.
102. Act of June 19, 1907, ch. 238, 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 889 (approved by voters Nov.
1908); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
103. Act of June 28, 1923, ch. 289, 1923 Wis. Sess. Laws 482 (approved by voters Nov.
1924); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
104. J. Res. 3, 1945 Wis. Sess. Laws 114 (approved by voters Apr. 1945); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 237.
105. J. Res. 1, 1949 Wis. Sess. Laws 637 (approved by voters Apr. 1949); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 237.
106. J. Res. 15, 1959 Wis. Sess. Laws 918 (approved by voters Apr. 1960); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 237.
107. See WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 10.
108. Act of June 8, 1925, ch. 270, 1925 Wis. Sess. Laws 348 (approved by voters Nov.
1926); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
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partial vetoes on appropriations bills.'" Governor Tommy Thompson's
creative use of the partial veto in the late 1980s and 1990s would later
spark a reaction and a new amendment to the veto power.ll0
E. Amendments, 1960-Present: Reform and Reaction Revisited
The 1960s witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of proposed
amendments to the Wisconsin Constitution. The tide of amendments
receded somewhat after 1970, but has remained high compared to
preceding eras.'' But at the same time, there has been only a modest
rise in the number of housekeeping amendments, and relatively few
recent substantive amendments are likely to have lasting historical
importance. 2
Although the number of housekeeping amendments since 1960 has
been comparatively modest, some of the amendments have made
important changes in Wisconsin's governmental structure. In 1967,
voters extended the terms of the governor and other state officers from
two years to four; this has given recent governors a longer period of time
in which to develop and enact their programs and has significantly
changed the dynamics of the interaction between the governor and the
legislature. "3  In 1977, voters approved a sweeping overhaul of
Wisconsin's judicial system: a patchwork of local courts which had
grown in random fashion over the course of a century was replaced with
a unitary circuit court system and an intermediate court of appeals,
which has reduced the supreme court's workload and has become a
major new source of case law shaping the state's legal system."' In the
late 1980s, Governor Thompson interpreted his partial veto power to
allow deletion of individual numbers and letters from language in
legislative bills, thus enabling him in many cases to substitute his own
budget figures and even his own policies for those enacted by the
109. J. Res. 43, 1929 Wis. Sess. Laws 1079 (approved by voters Nov. 1930); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236. See generally Arthur J. Harrington, The
Propriety of the Negative-The Governor's Partial Veto Authority, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 865
(1977).
110. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 614-19.
111. See Figure 1 and accompanying text infra Part III.B.
112. See Figure 1 and accompanying text infra Part III.B.
113. J. Res. 10, 1967 Wis. Sess. Laws 489 (approved by voters Apr. 1967); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 238.
114. J. Res. 7, 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws 890 (approved by voters Apr. 1977); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 239; RANNEY, supra note 7, at 596-601. See
generally Donald P. Kommers, The Development and Reorganization of the Wisconsin Court
System (Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Wisconsin, 1963).
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legislature. " ' The Wisconsin Supreme Court largely agreed with
Thompson's view of his powers, 116 and in reaction, the legislature passed
and voters approved in 1990 an amendment prohibiting the deletion of
individual letters from bills.117
A review of proposed substantive amendments since 1960 reveals at
least two important trends. First, there has been relatively little
amendment of the constitution in response to the steady expansion of
government and government programs since 1960. It appears that
lawmakers and voters have found the statutory process and the concept
of "public purpose" as constitutionally defined prior to 1960 to be
adequate for such expansion."' Voters have generally resisted further
expansion of state and municipal powers. In 1975 and 1976, they
rejected proposals to exclude certain types of debt from the five percent
debt limit and to increase the limit to ten percent for all purposes. "9 In
1968, they agreed to expand the types of taxes that can be used to pay
for forestry programs, 2° and in 1975 they modestly expanded the 1949
exception to the internal improvements clause for veterans housing,21
but in 1991 they refused to expand the exception to encompass low
income housing.'22
Second, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of
constitutional amendments to promote non-economic social policies.
The two leading examples are the rise of state support for parochial
schools and of state-sanctioned gambling. The 1848 constitution
115. RANNEY, supra note 7, at 614-19.
116. Id.; see, e.g., State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 424 N.W.2d
385 (1988); Citizens Utility Bd. v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 485, 534 N.W.2d 508 (1995). But see
Risser v. Klauser, 207 Wis. 2d 177, 558 N.W.2d 108 (1997) (finding that the governor
exceeded his partial veto authority in a specific instance).
117. See WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10(1)(c); accord J. Res. 39, 1989 Wis. Sess. Laws 1793
(approved by voters Apr. 1990); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 239.
118. See 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 238-40; Town of Beloit v.
County of Rock, 2003 WI 8, 27, 259 Wis. 2d 37, [ 27, 657 N.W.2d 344, 1 27 ("[A]lthough
there is no specific language in the state constitution establishing the public purpose doctrine,
this court has recognized that the doctrine is firmly accepted as a basic constitutional tenet
mandating that public appropriations may not be used for other than public purposes.").
119. J. Res. 33, 1973 Wis. Sess. Laws 1152 (rejected by voters Apr. 1975); J. Res. 6, 1975
Wis. Sess. Laws 1464 (rejected by voters Apr. 1976); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK,
supra note 5, at 238-39.
120. J. Res. 25, 1967 Wis. Sess. Laws 502 (approved by voters Apr. 1968); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 238.
121. J. Res. 3, 1975 Wis. Sess. Laws 1462 (approved by voters Apr. 1975); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 238.
122. J. Res. 2, 1991 Wis. Sess. Laws 1799 (rejected by voters Apr. 1991); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 239.
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required the state to create a system of free common schools in which
"no sectarian instruction shall be allowed.' ' 123 Between 1850 and 1900,
German Catholics immigrated to Wisconsin in large numbers; in many
cases they preferred parochial, German-language schools to public
schools. Tension steadily increased between them and Wisconsinites of
Yankee background, who favored use of public schools to foster cultural
assimilation of immigrant children. 124  The conflict came to a head in
1889 when the legislature enacted the Bennett Law, mandating English-
language instruction in all schools and restricting immigrants' ability to
establish parochial schools.'25 The Bennett Law triggered a sharp
political reaction: the 1891 legislature repealed the law, but parochial
school supporters, recognizing the depth of Yankee sentiment and that
assimilation was important to their children's future success, abandoned
further efforts to preserve German-language instruction and many other
badges of cultural separateness.126
Parochial school supporters then launched a campaign to gain state
funding, particularly for school busing. After several rebuffs by the
legislature and the Wisconsin Supreme Court, mainly due to concerns
that such funding might violate constitutional restrictions on sectarian
instruction and separation between church and state, supporters turned
to the constitutional amendment process. 127 A proposed amendment to
allow state aid for parochial school busing was defeated in 1946,128 but a
similar amendment was finally approved in 1967.129 Since that time, the
supreme court has been more sympathetic to limited state funding of
parochial schools and no further constitutional amendments have been
proposed. 130
123. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (amended).
124. Joseph A. Ranney, "Absolute Common Ground": The Four Eras of Assimilation in
Wisconsin Education Law, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 790, 796-801.
125. Act of Apr. 18, 1889, ch. 519, 1889 Wis. Sess. Laws 729. See generally Louise P.
Kellogg, The Bennett Law in Wisconsin, WIS. MAG. HIST., Sept. 1918, at 3.
126. Ranney, supra note 124, at 802-03.
127. Id. at 803-05; State ex rel. Van Straten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392
(1923); Costigan v. Hall, 249 Wis. 94, 23 N.W.2d 495 (1946); William W. Boyer, Jr., Public
Transportation of Parochial School Pupils, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 64, 67-78.
128. J. Res. 78, 1945 Wis. Sess. Laws 1165 (rejected by voters Nov. 1946); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 237.
129. J. Res. 13, 1967 Wis. Sess. Laws 492 (approved by voters Apr. 1967); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 238.
130. Ranney, supra note 124, at 805-20; see State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d
539 (1971), affd, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602
(1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
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In 1848, gambling, though popular with many Americans, was
officially and often strenuously disapproved of by many religious
denominations and by most state and local governments."' The 1848
constitution tersely provided that "The legislature shall never authorize
any lottery," and for more than a century this was construed to prohibit
all forms of gambling for money in Wisconsin.'32 After World War II,
popular attitudes gradually relaxed toward gambling, sex, and other
activities that historically had been subjects of moral controversy.'33 In
1965, Wisconsin voters created the first breach in the wall against
gambling by amending the constitution to make clear that game show
contests would not be considered lotteries within the meaning of the
constitution.' The breach expanded steadily. In 1973, the voters gave
charitable bingo games constitutional sanction, and in 1977, they
extended the sanction to charitable raffles. 1
35
The economic stagnation and sharp anti-tax sentiment of the late
1970s and early 1980s led many states, including Wisconsin, to look to
gambling as a new source of revenue, 136 and in 1987, after extensive
public debate, voters authorized a state lottery and pari-mutuel
betting. 3 7 In 1995, voters rejected a proposed amendment to authorize
a sports lottery, dedicated to building athletic facilities,'38 but in 1999,
they affirmed that state revenues from gambling were to serve as a
source of property tax relief.3 9  The gambling amendments have
131. See Jonathan Kasparek, Void in Wisconsin, WIS. MAG. HIST., Autumn 2006, at 36,
37-40; ANN FABIAN, CARD SHARPS AND BUCKET SHOPS: GAMBLING IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 113-28 (1990). See generally JOHN M. FINDLAY, PEOPLE OF CHANCE:
GAMBLING IN AMERICAN SOCIETY FROM JAMESTOWN TO LAS VEGAS 11-43 (1986).
132. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (amended).
133. See FINDLAY, supra note 131, at 125-49; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 341-50 (1993).
134. J. Res. 2, 1965 Wis. Sess. Laws 831 (approved by voters Apr. 1965); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 238.
135. J. Res. 3, 1973 Wis. Sess. Laws 1127 (approved by voters Apr. 1973); J. Res. 6, 1977
Wis. Sess. Laws 889 (approved by voters Apr. 1977); 2005-06 Wisconsin Blue Book, supra
note 5, at 238-39.
136. See generally DAN RITSCHE, WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU,
RESEARCH BULLETIN 00-1, THE EVOLUTION OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING IN WISCONSIN
(2000).
137. J. Res. 3, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 687 (pari-mutuel betting) (approved by voters Apr.
1987); J. Res. 4, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 688 (state lottery) (approved by voters Apr. 1987);
2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 239.
138. J. Res. 2, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 2502 (rejected by voters Apr. 1995); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 240.
139. J. Res. 2, 1999 Wis. Sess. Laws 1588 (approved by voters Apr. 1999); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 240.
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effectively eviscerated the constitution's original prohibition against
gambling. In hindsight, perhaps it would have been better to either
eliminate the anti-gambling clause altogether or to provide that
gambling matters shall be left to the legislature. But voters clearly were
not ready for such a step in the 1960s and 1970s; the current patchwork
nature of the constitution's gambling clause suggests that in the case of a
fundamental document, major changes must be made incrementally
rather than in a sweeping manner if they and the constitution are to last.
Use of amendments to implement other controversial social policies
has also flourished in recent years. In response to complaints that
Wisconsin criminal law put too much emphasis on the rights of the
accused and ignored the needs of crime victims, the 1991 legislature
proposed, and in 1993 voters adopted, an amendment giving crime
victims the right to be treated with dignity and to be involved in
prosecution of cases.'O In 1998, voters approved an amendment to the
constitution's bill of rights guaranteeing the right to keep and bear arms
for security, recreation, and other lawful purposes, and in 2003, they
created a constitutional right to fish, hunt, and take game.'4 2 In response
to the legalization of civil unions for same-sex partners in several
eastern states and the Massachusetts supreme court's 2003 decision that
same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry, 43 the 2003 and
2005 Wisconsin legislatures approved a broad "defense of marriage
amendment" explicitly prohibiting same-sex marriages and arguably
precluding state and local governments from giving same-sex couples
other benefits1l 4 In November 2006, after a hard-fought campaign,
Wisconsin voters ratified the amendment by a 59%-41% margin.1
45
Such recent amendments have prompted complaints that the legislature
140. J. Res. 17, 1991 Wis. Sess. Laws 1809 (first consideration); J. Res. 2, 1993 Wis. Sess.
Laws 1833 (approved by voters Apr. 1993); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5,
at 240.
141. J. Res. 21, 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 2332 (approved by voters Nov. 1998); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 240.
142. J. Res. 8, 2003 Wis. Sess. Laws 1097 (approved by voters Apr. 2003); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 240.
143. See Carl Rasmussen & Susan L. Collins, Wisconsin Constitutional Amendment to
Define Marriage: The Legal Context, WiS. LAWYER, Mar. 2005, at 16; Goodridge v. Dep't of
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
144. J. Res. 29, 2003 Wis. Sess. Laws 1111 (first consideration); J. Res. 30, 2005 Wis.
Sess. Laws 1 (approved by voters Nov. 2006); Rasmussen & Collins, supra note 143, at 16.
145. Wis. State Elections Board, Results of Referendum: 11/07/2006, available at
http://elections.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=10047&locid=47.
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is using the amendment process too freely, often merely as a device to
avoid gubernatorial vetoes of controversial measures.'6
III. AN AGGREGATE ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTION'S
AMENDMENTS
A. Historical Trends by Subject
Persons attempting to classify state constitutional provisions can
choose from a large menu of categories. Thomas Cooley, the first great
scholar of state constitutions, set forth five categories: bills of rights;
suffrage; creation of a governmental framework; creation of checks and
balances between the branches of government; and local government.
147
Lutz has added several categories to Cooley's taxonomy including
taxation, handling of debt, and social and economic activities to be
undertaken by the state.' All American state constitutions include
Cooley's basic categories; the additional categories they feature depend
largely on the degree of detail their authors chose to put in them and on
accidents of history. In order to analyze Wisconsin's constitutional
amendments by subject category, it is most useful to construct categories
from the amendments themselves rather than trying to fit the
amendments into a predetermined taxonomy.
TABLE 2
"TRADITIONAL" CATEGORIES OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
149
Suffrage Legislative Judicial
Organization and Organization and
Powers Powers
1848-1900 1 2 4
1900-1920 3 6 4
1920-1960 3 4 4
1960-present 4 8 13
146. See supra text accompanying note 6.
147. COOLEY, supra note 3, at 34-35.
148. Lutz, supra note 3, at 36-37.
149. The data in the table are compiled from the 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK,
supra note 5, at 235-40.
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In Wisconsin, certain types of amendments have surfaced
consistently throughout the state's history while other types have
become prominent only in recent decades. Amendments in three of
Cooley's and Lutz's categories-suffrage, the legislative branch, and the
judicial branch-have appeared regularly since 1848. The steady stream
of legislative amendments is not surprising because the 1848 constitution
reflected the then-prevailing belief that the bulk of state power should
reside in the legislature rather than with the governor. ' Wisconsin, like
other states and in contrast to the Federal Constitution, vests plenary
power in its legislature, limited only by restrictions placed elsewhere in
the state constitution.' Since 1848, voters have regularly considered
housekeeping changes with respect to legislative salaries, terms of office
and other organizational details'52 and since 1908, they have gradually
expanded legislative powers to act for the state's social and economic
good.
Likewise, Wisconsin voters have regularly adjusted the organization
of the judicial branch. The vast majority of judicial amendments have
been housekeeping matters: after an early struggle to establish its
proper role in state government, the supreme court held in State ex rel.
Bashford v. Barstow that it had the final say as to whether actions of the
executive and the legislature were constitutional,'53 and unlike the
United States Congress, Wisconsin voters have never attempted to
change the scope of their courts' jurisdiction or collective powers.'54 But
the state has consistently found it necessary to tinker with the types of
courts and number of judges assigned to exercise such powers,
beginning with efforts to increase the size of the state supreme court in
the 1870s'55 and continuing through the reorganization of the trial courts
and creation of an intermediate court of appeals in the 1970s.
156
Suffrage amendments, though rare, have also occurred throughout the
150. FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 106-07.
151. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43, 82, 87-90 and 110-12. See generally
2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235-40.
153. 4 Wis. 567, 659, 662, 746, 748 (1855).
154. See generally 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235-40. As to
congressional laws limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts, see, for example, Judiciary Act,
ch. 20, 1 STATS. 73 (1789); 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888, pt. 1, at 463-87 (1971)
(discussing Congress's decision to deprive the U.S. Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear
appeals from habeas corpus cases during Reconstruction).
155. See supra text accompanying note 40.
156. See supra text accompanying note 114.
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state's history. They have often tracked national movements to extend
or modify suffrage. For example, the elimination of alien suffrage in
1908 reflected in part Progressive distaste for the party caucus system of
the late nineteenth century, which had served as a vehicle for
immigrants to assimilate into American politics and eventually acquire a
share of power.'57 The Progressives' efforts to enact government reform
by initiative, recall, and referendum also were part of a broad national
movement.' 8 Wisconsin's amendment of the constitution in 1934 to
formally extend the vote to women merely confirmed the practical
completion of that process fifteen years before," 9 and a 1953
amendment to require apportionment of legislative seats based on
population as well as area was part of a national debate over
apportionment finally resolved in 1962 when the United States Supreme
Court held that apportionment must be based on population only.'16
TABLE 3
"MODERN" CATEGORIES OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
161
Bill of Executive Local State Gambling
Rights Organization Powers Debt,
and Powers Taxation
1848-1900 1 0 1 0 0
1900-1920 0 0 3 1 0
1920-1960 2 1 6 6 0
1960-present 11 3 17 8 7
Other types of amendments, while not completely unknown in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, have come to prominence only
in recent decades. During its first century, Wisconsin considered
157. See THELEN, supra note 60, at 156-201; LINK & MCCORMICK, supra note 77, at 47-
52.
158. See MARGULIES, supra note 60, at 157-58; LINK & MCCORMICK, supra note 77, at
34, 57-58, 61.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; J. Res. 76, 1933 Wis. Sess. Laws 1261 (approved by
voters Nov. 1934); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236; RANNEY, supra
note 7, at 216.
160. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidated the
1953 amendment based on technical defects. See State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264
Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953).
161. The data in the table are compiled from the 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK,
supra note 5, at 235-40.
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changes to its bill of rights only three times: it modified the grand jury
system in 1870, 162 modified jury trial rights in 1922 to allow five-sixths
verdicts in civil cases, 163 and rejected an early effort to allow state
support for parochial school transport in 1946. 6' But since 1960, the
number of amendments implicating the bill of rights has increased
dramatically. Wisconsin has redefined its concept of the relationship
between church and state through a series of amendments allowing
limited state support of parochial school activities.1 65 In 1973, voters
narrowly refused to approve an amendment enshrining equal rights for
women, 166 but they have also approved an amendment to make the
constitution's terminology gender neutral.' 67 The most controversial
amendments of recent years have implicated the bill of rights: the 1993
crime victim amendment can fairly be characterized as an attempt to
counterbalance constitutional rights afforded to criminal defendants,"6
the 1998 arms amendment is Wisconsin's equivalent of the Second
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,'69 and the "defense of marriage"
amendment is closely related to the issue of how Wisconsin's concept of
equal rights applies to same-sex couples.1 70
Other categories that have become dramatically more active since
1960 are gambling, local governmental powers, and state debt and
taxation. As previously noted, the nineteenth century's moral
disapproval of gambling reflected in the 1848 constitution remained
intact for more than a century, but began eroding in 1965; after
162. Act of Mar. 17, 1870, ch. 118, 1869 Wis. Sess. Laws 180 (approved by voters Nov.
Nov. 1870); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
163. Act of July 1921, ch. 504, 1921 Wis. Sess. Laws 840 (approved by voters Nov. 1922);
2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
164. J. Res. 78, 1945 Wis. Sess. Laws 1165 (rejected by voters Nov. 1946); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 237.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 128-30.
166. J. Res. 5, 1973 Wis. Sess. Laws 1132 (rejected by voters Apr. 1973); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 238.
167. J. Res. 29, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 1698 (approved by voters Nov. 1982); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 239. In 1995, voters defeated a proposed
amendment eliminating additional masculine references in the constitution; the amendment's
defeat may have been due to the fact that it was coupled with an unpopular sports lottery
amendment. J. Res. 12, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 2503 (rejected by voters Apr. 1995); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 240.
168. See J. Res. 2, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 1832 (approved by voters Apr. 1993); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 240.
169. Compare J. Res. 21, 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 2332 (approved by voters Nov. 1998), and
2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 240, with U.S. CONST. amend. II.
170. See Rasmussen & Collins, supra note 143.
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extensive debate, state voters decided in 1987 to effectively gut
constitutional prohibitions on gambling by permitting a lottery and pari-
mutuel betting, and gambling has rapidly become a fixture of the
Wisconsin social scene.171 The 1874 amendment limiting municipal debt
to five percent of assessed property value,17 though arguably the most
important amendment of the nineteenth century, was an isolated case:
with two exceptions,173 voters made no further important constitutional
changes to municipal powers until the 1960s. Between 1960 and 1972,
voters, in a series of amendments, created Wisconsin's modern county
government system; 171 since 1960, they have also made changes to
constitutional debt and financing provisions to allow municipalities to
fully perform the functions assigned to them in the late twentieth
century. 175
At first blush, it is surprising that municipal powers amendments
were not more frequent before 1960. Municipalities have always played
a vital role in carrying out governmental functions in Wisconsin, and the
legislature has enacted a steady stream of laws affecting municipalities
throughout the state's history.176  The most likely explanation is that
once the issue of municipal debt for internal improvements was
constitutionally resolved, statutory change was sufficient to
accommodate the growth of municipal powers for the next fifty years.
The 1924 home rule amendment reflected the fact that by the 1920s the
role of municipal, as well as state, government had grown sufficiently
that formal delegation of some legislative power to municipalities was
necessary, but that it was not necessary to regulate the details of local
171. See supra text accompanying notes 132-35.
172. Act of Feb. 18, 1874, ch. 37, 1874 Wis. Sess. Laws 43 (approved by voters Nov.
1874); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
173. Act of July 13, 1921, ch. 566, 1921 Wis. Sess. Laws 937 (authorizing additional debt
for utility acquisition) (rejected by voters Nov. 1922); Act of June 4, 1923, ch. 203, 1923 Wis.
Sess. Law 380 (authorizing local home rule) (approved by voters Nov. 1924); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
174. J. Res. 64, 1961 Wis. Sess. Laws 727 (county executive terms) (approved by voters
Nov. 1962); J. Res. 2, 1969 Wis. Sess. Laws 1515 (county government) (approved by voters
Apr. 1969); J. Res. 13, 1971 Wis. Sess. Laws 1319 (county government systems) (approved by
voters Apr. 1972); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 237-38.
175. See 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 237-40.
176. See RANNEY, supra note 7, at 125-30. See generally WIS. STATS. chs. 59-68 (2004-
2005) (addressing, among other things, the government and management of municipalities,
including towns, villages, and cities; county and civil service; municipal budget systems).
[90:667
AMENDMENT HABIT: DISEASE OR CURE?
administration at the constitutional level. 177  The wave of municipal
amendments after 1960 reflected, in part, the need to give constitutional
sanction to county government and, in part, the need to adjust
constitutional debt and financing limits.
178
The rise in amendments pertaining to state debt and taxation since
1960 has a similar underpinning. The transition after 1848 from an
agricultural to a commercial and industrial economy and changes in
population has required regular revisions to Wisconsin's tax system;
constitutional amendments have been required in several cases because
of the constitution's uniform taxation clause. 79 But lawmakers have
tried to confine change to the statutory level as much as possible, and
for the most part they have succeeded. The only amendments of
importance needed before 1960 were the 1908 amendment authorizing
an income tax"' and the 1927 amendment authorizing taxation for the
forestry program."' Most tax-related amendments since 1960 have been
primarily technical in nature; relatively few have been controversial, but
they have been necessary because of the breadth of the uniformity
clause.
B. Rates of Amendment Proposal and Passage
FIGURE 1182
177. See Act of June 4, 1923, ch. 203, 1923 Wis. Sess. Laws 380 (approved by voters Nov.
1924); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236; RANNEY, supra note 7, at
381-88.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
179. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; see RANNEY, supra note 7, at 289-312.
180. Act of July 16, 1907, ch. 661, 1907 Wis. Sess. Laws 1253 (approved by voters Nov.
1908); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235.
181. J. Res. 13, 1927 Wis. Sess. Laws 972 (approved by voters Apr. 1927); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236.
182. The data used to construct this figure are taken from the 2005-2006 WISCONSIN
BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235-40.
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Several things stand out when one examines the number of
constitutional amendments proposed over time and the number of
amendments approved by Wisconsin voters. The flow of proposed
amendments was modest in the nineteenth century and, with the
exception of the Progressive era, remained so until 1960. While the
number of proposed amendments rose temporarily during the
Progressive era, the number of amendments approved remained roughly
the same as in the nineteenth century: as previously noted, voters
rejected a large group of proposed Progressive amendments at the 1914
election."' That election marked the end of the Progressive era and
dashed Progressives' hopes of transforming the balance of powers
within Wisconsin government through the initiative, referendum, and
recall processes,' as well as their hopes for a broad state-sponsored
insurance system. '  The Progressives' effort to use constitutional
amendments to further their reform program was largely a failure, but it
did not matter. Despite the program's many controversial and far-
reaching features, most of its core elements did not require
constitutional changes: they were created by statute. 1
8 6
The number of proposed amendments rose dramatically in the 1960s
and remained relatively high through the 1980s.18 Amendments during
this period were not the product of a single social or economic
movement: they covered numerous areas including the bill of rights,
suffrage, the organization and powers of each branch of government and
of local government, taxation and state debt, and gambling.' The rise
was due to several factors. The social upheavals of the 1950s and 1960s
and the reaction thereto account for a number of amendments such as
the gender equality and neutrality amendments of the 1970s and 1980s,
as well as the more recent crime victim and arms amendments and the
183. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
184. See Act of Aug. 7, 1913, ch. 770, 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 1209 (rejected by the voters
Nov. 1914); 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 236; see also supra text
accompanying notes 80-83.
185. See ch. 770, 1913 Wis. Sess. Laws 1209; 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra
note 5, at 236;
186. The number of amendments proposed and amendment rejection rates during the
1920-1960 period were unremarkable, except for a sudden burst of voter resistance in the
1940s: four of the ten amendments proposed during that decade were rejected and an
amendment to allow state spending for veterans housing passed only narrowly. 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 237.
187. See Table 1 and accompanying text supra Part II.B; see Figure 1 and accompanying
text infra Part III.B.
188. See Table 2 and accompanying text supra Part II.A; Table 3 and accompanying
text supra Part III.A.
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"defense of marriage" amendment.1 89  The relaxation of attitudes
toward gambling in the 1950s and 1960s, part of a larger social trend to
redefine basic rights and the pursuit of happiness in individual rather
than societal terms, contributed to the wave of amendments that
transformed gambling in Wisconsin.'" Perhaps most important, many
amendments have been necessary to reconfigure portions of the
constitution still largely geared to the nineteenth century-most notably
the internal improvements clause and the uniform taxation clause.' 9'
The post-1960 tide of amendments may be receding: the 1990s and
the first six years of the twenty-first century have witnessed the lowest
number of proposed amendments and the highest amendment rejection
rate of any period since 1960.1' However, an unusually high proportion
of the amendments passed in the 1990s involved controversial social
issues, including modification of the governor's partial veto power
(1990), 93 the crime victims amendment (1993), 94 and the arms
amendment (1998). 9' Relatively few technical amendments necessary
to accommodate the constitution to economic and technological changes
were enacted in the 1990s, but it is unlikely that the need for technical
amendments has come to an end in Wisconsin. Whether the period
since 1990 is simply a temporary aberration in a continuing era of
frequent amendment or the beginning of a new era of restraint remains
to be seen.
IV. CONCLUSION
As noted at the beginning of this Article, Wisconsin's constitution
has lived a long and relatively healthy life compared to most American
state constitutions. But does this mean that the constitution has been a
success and should be continued? The history of Wisconsin's
189. See RANNEY, supra note 7, at 645; supra text accompanying notes 133-46.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 131-39; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE
REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 2-3, 29-35 (1990).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 101-09 (discussing amendments expanding state
powers to promote public welfare); supra text accompanying notes 98-99 (discussing
amendments expanding analogous municipal powers).
192. 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 240; see Figure 1 and
accompanying text supra Part III.B.
193. J. Res. 39, 1989 Wis. Sess. Laws 1793 (approved by voters Apr. 1990); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 239.
194. J. Res. 2, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 1832 (approved by voters Apr. 1993); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 240.
195. J. Res. 21, 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 2332 (approved by voters Nov. 1998); 2005-2006
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 240.
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constitutional amendments provides two useful approaches to this
question. First, it provides insights as to why Wisconsin has not felt it
necessary to enact new constitutions or to amend its original
constitution beyond recognition. Second, the patterns of amendment
and of amendment rejection over the course of the state's history
provide clues as to what parts of the constitution might usefully be
changed by reformers and what parts are better left alone.
The relative stability of Wisconsin's constitution is due mainly to the
caution of the state's founders-ironically, a caution bred out of the
1846 convention's overenthusiasm for enshrining social reforms in the
constitution-and to the fact that Wisconsin has not endured as many
social and legal upheavals as some states, most notably the Southern
states during and after the Civil War. 196 The 1847-1848 convention did
not eschew all social reform, but it was careful to leave the most
controversial topics of the day to the legislature's discretion, either by
maintaining silence in the constitution or by inserting general directives
to the legislature to pass "wholesome" laws on such subjects."9
Banking, homestead exemptions, and married women's property laws
all received attention from the legislature and underwent substantial
change during the last half of the nineteenth century. 198 If Wisconsin
had been forced to deal with such changes through constitutional
amendment rather than statutes, at a minimum, the state's rate of
amendment would have been much higher than it was, and it is quite
possible that at some point voters would have decided the mass of
changes needed was so large that the best way to deal with the problem
was enactment of a new constitution. The wisdom of the founders'
constitutional caution was confirmed during the Progressive era: the
Progressive reform program, which thoroughly reshaped Wisconsin
government and fully ushered Wisconsin into the regulatory age, was
accomplished almost exclusively by statute and generated no calls for a
new constitution.'" In 1914, when Progressives sought to extend their
reform of government to include lawmaking by initiative and
referendum, voters firmly signaled that they did not want the
Progressive revolution to rise to constitutional status.2°°
196. ERIC S. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877, at 330-33 (1988).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
198. See RANNEY, supra note 7, at 72-73, 204-10.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 62-84.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 79 and 83.
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The 1847-1848 convention inserted some details in the constitution
which later became controversial and required amendment. In
hindsight, some of these clearly should have been omitted. For
example, if the founders had left the matter of official salaries to the
legislature (as was finally done in the 1920s),1 a string of proposed
amendments and amendment rejections in the late nineteenth century
could have been avoided. If the tenure of sheriffs and other local
officials had been left to the legislature, another string of amendments
and rejections, this one stretching well into the twentieth century, also
could have been avoided. 2°2 But one cannot fault Wisconsin's founders
too much: such details were found in many state constitutions in the
mid-nineteenth century, the product of a time when government was
less complex and delegation of functions was considerably less of a
necessity than it is now. °3
Other provisions that later necessitated amendment perhaps could
not have been avoided, most notably the internal improvements clause
and the uniform taxation clause. As early as 1859, Justice Cole, a
member of the 1847-1848 convention, openly regretted that the
constitution's ban on state subsidy of internal improvements had not
been expanded to cover municipal subsidies as well. Another option
would have been to omit the clause altogether and leave subsidy issues
to the legislature. But the issue of internal improvement subsidies,
although thorny, was of vital importance to all American states in the
mid-nineteenth century.20 Legislative efforts in other states that had
addressed subsidy issues without constitutional guidance had often
brought disaster,205 and the 1847-1848 Wisconsin convention would have
faced severe criticism if it had not addressed the issue in some manner.
The fact that even after many years of wrestling with its own subsidy-
related crisis Wisconsin chose to limit rather than eliminate municipal
subsidies indicates that Cole's preference for a simple solution, namely a
ban on all subsidies, was not shared by his constituents.2' As to
taxation, in 1848 the bulk of Wisconsin's wealth lay in its land and
uniform taxation was therefore a simple matter. Tax uniformity was
201. Act of June 6, 1925, ch. 413, 1925 Wis. Sess. Laws 605 (governors' salary) (approved
by voters Nov. 1926); J. Res. 57, 1927 Wis. Sess. Laws 994 (legislators' salary) (first
consideration); J. Res. 6, 1929 Wis. Sess. Laws 1065 (approved by voters Apr. 1929).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43, 86-88.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23,45-54.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
206. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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considered a central component of broader American ideals of equality
and was deemed a matter of constitutional stature by many states.' °7
Only extraordinary foresight would have enabled the 1847-1848
convention to anticipate the new types of wealth the industrial
revolution would create and the problems such change would cause the
tax system.0 8 Even so, most of the problems that arose were eventually
handled by statute.2°9
The patterns of accepted and rejected amendments that have
developed over time provide useful lessons to Wisconsinites who may
wish to enact a new constitution or systematically overhaul the present
document. Reformers should look first to housekeeping provisions in
the constitution. Some, such as salary provisions, have been
eliminated,210 but some remain."' Before proceeding, reformers should
also draw a careful line between housekeeping and non-housekeeping
measures. The matter of local officials' terms of office is a case in point:
in light of the legislature's plenary power over local governments and
the amount of constitutional controversy the issue of sheriffs' terms of
office has generated,2 2 the prospect of leaving the issue to the
legislature is attractive, but the ideal of localized control of government
runs deep and the amount of controversy this subject has generated
suggests it may be important enough to retain constitutional status.
Several substantive matters also commend themselves to reformers'
attention. Consideration should be given to eliminating the internal
improvements clause. The nineteenth century economic conditions that
gave rise to the clause have long since disappeared. Arguably the clause
has been more of a nuisance than a useful check on government
expansion: amendments have repeatedly been needed to implement
policies for which there was clear popular consensus simply because the
improvements clause stood in the way.13 It seems likely that the
political process and common-law limits on expansion of social
207. See RANNEY, supra note 7, at 290-94; see also 2 BENJAMIN PERLEY POORE, THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 2098 (1878) (compiling American state constitutions; as of
1877 nearly all state constitutions contained a uniform taxation clause).
208. See RANNEY, supra note 7, at 290-309.
209. Id.
210. See supra text accompanying note 85.
211. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. arts. IV, § 25 (setting forth procedures for state printing and
stationery contracts), XI, § 4 (authorizing state to enact general banking laws), XIII, § 11
(prohibiting donation of free passes and franking privileges to candidates for office).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 91-97 and 100-08.
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programs, particularly the public purpose doctrine, will be adequate
checks on unwarranted expansion in the future. Likewise, a strong case
can be made that the uniform taxation clause has become more of a
nuisance than a fundamental principle 2"4 and that any future concerns
about discriminatory taxation could be addressed through general equal
protection principles.1 5
Reformers-and Wisconsinites generally-should also carefully
consider whether the recent increase in amendments incorporating
controversial social policies is good for the state.1 6 Realistically, such
amendments can never be completely eliminated from constitutions:
many measures seen as controversial in one era come to be considered
fundamental rights in another era, and it is difficult to predict which
changes in social values are mere fads and which will last. But in this
author's view, public opinion on matters such as gambling, domestic
relations, and the definition of marriage 21' has been changed often
enough over the course of Wisconsin's history that such matters are not
appropriate for inclusion in the constitution. The legislature is best
equipped to adjust the law in such areas to the ebb and flow of public
opinion.
Probably the best means of alleviating this problem is to make it
more difficult to amend the Wisconsin Constitution. As in other states,
Wisconsin's requirement that two consecutive legislatures pass an
amendment does not appear to have been an effective device for
filtering out marginal amendments, 218 but increasing the majority vote
requirement to a greater proportion (perhaps two-thirds) for legislative
passage, for voter ratification, or for both likely would reduce the
number of amendments. If the founders had required a two-thirds vote
for ratification, only 57 of Wisconsin's 145 amendments would have
passed. 219 Reformers should consider enacting such a measure in order
to honor the founders' intent that "fundamental changes [be] placed
214. See supra text accompanying notes 96-107.
215. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also, e.g., Wisconsin Prof'l
Police Ass'n v. Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, IT 221-23, 243 Wis. 2d 512, [[ 221-23, 627 N.W.2d
807, 221-23 (setting forth the test for determining when legislative classifications are
permissible under state and federal equal protection clauses).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 137-46.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 132-46.
218. Lutz, supra note 3, at 30-31.
219. See 2005-2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra note 5, at 235-40.
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beyond the reach of any sudden ebullition of feeling, prompted by
whatever motive.,
20
That being said, it must also be said that Wisconsin's constitutional
system has, in the main, been successful. The reforms discussed above
would likely be useful, but it is far from certain that a new constitution is
the best way to achieve them. Even if a new constitution were enacted,
the only certainty is that a new series of amendments will unfold as the
twenty-first century brings to Wisconsin changes that no one can now
foretell.
220. See selections from the Prairie du Chien PATRIOT, supra note 36.
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